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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the West Virginia legislature enacted House Bill 4112
which revised the law of intestate succession and elective share in
* Professor of Law, West Virginia College of Law; A.B., 1964, West Virginia Uni-
versity; J.D., 1967, West Virginia University.
Members of the West Virginia State Bar Probate Committee have been instrumental
in identifying the issues and suggesting the solutions incorporated in the 1993 amendments.
Thomas G. Freeman, II, chair of the committee and members Marcia F. Allen, William T.
Belcher, Richard E. Boyle, Jr., Lynn S. Clarke, Milton T. Hemdon, William H. Scharf and
Bruce L. Stout deserve special recognition for their work on the intestate succession and
elective share revisions and the 1993 amendments.
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West Virginia. The new law became effective June 5, 1992.' Follow-
ing its passage, a number of West Virginia Continuing Legal Educa-
tion programs were offered to introduce the new law and to explain its
provisions. While thiere was an anticipated resistance to such a substan-
tial change to the law of intestacy, the "complaints" were essentially in
opposition to "change" and not the substance of the new law. Essen-
tially no one disputes that as far as a statutory scheme, the new law is
a significant improvement over the law it replaced.
Perhaps the most common complaint about HB 4112 was that it
significantly complicated the law of elective share. If one compares the
new statutory provisions for elective share2 with the statute it re-
placed,3 such a complaint would seem to be well-founded. However,
if one compares the new statute with the law of elective share as it
existed prior to the passage of HB 4112, the change is not nearly as
pronounced. The West Virginia Supreme Court's decisions in Davis v.
KB & T Co.4 and Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank5 clearly
chartered a course of "equitable" distribution of the decedent's assets
in the event the surviving spouse elected against the will.' In essence,
these decisions authorized the court, on a case by case basis, to recoup
"assets" the decedent "controlled" or benefitted from to provide an
enhanced or augmented estate to which the statutory percentage for the
elective share Would be applied. Which "assets" and under what cir-
cumstances the "assets" would be recaptured was to be developed by
the court on a case by case basis. While the statutory percentage of
1. In Kidwell v. Kidwell, 431 S.E.2d 346 (W. Va. 1993), the court, consistent with
its earlier decisions, affirmed that the new elective share statute would not apply where the
decedent died before June 5, 1992.
2. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1 to -7 (Supp. 1993).
3. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1 to -3 (1982) (amended 1992).
4. 309 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1983).
5. 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989).
6. For an excellent discussion of these decisions and the practical problems they pre-
sented see Scott A. Curnutte, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable Solu-
tion, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 441 (1989-90).
7. Syllabus 8 of Davis states the rule as follows:
No single standard can be applied to test the- validity of an inter-vivos trust at-
tacked by the settlor's spouse as a fraud upon his or her marital rights. Rather,
the issue is to be decided on a case by case basis, in light of the particular facts
and circumstances.
2
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the elective share under the old law remained constant,8 it would un-
doubtedly have taken many cases before there would have evolved
meaningful guidelines as to which assets, how many assets, and under
what circumstances previously "disposed" of assets would be "recap-
tured" for the purpose of the spouse's elective share. While the court's
imposition of its "equitable conscience" could produce "fair results" in
the case before the court, such a case by case approach had serious
disadvantages. "Equitable solutions" in such cases would undoubtedly
vary from county to county and probably within the same county in
multiple judge circuits. The cost of litigating each such case would
constitute a considerable drain on the assets of the estate.
Finally, in the absence of articulated guidelines as to how the
"equitable conscience" of the court would be applied, estate planners
would be unable to provide meaningful advice to their clients as to
more sophisticated estate plans. Furthermore, those consulted by the
surviving spouse would face the same quandary in advising the client
whether to renounce the will in favor of an elective share. It is there-
fore submitted that as opposed to complicating the law of elective
share, HB 4112 in fact provided a workable framework in which to
implement the concept of an "equitable apportionment" of a decedent's
assets that had already been adopted in principle by the court.
Davis, 309 S.E.2d at 46.
Syllabus 8 of the Davis case became syllabus 1 of the Johnson case, and the con-
cept was then enunciated further in syllabus 3 and 4 of the Johnson case as follows:
3. Under the flexible standard adopted by this Court in Davis v. KB & T, 172 W.
Va. 546, 309 S.E.2d 45 (1983), a court may consider the effect and validity of an
inter-vivos transfer by examining both the amount of control the settlor retains
over trust assets and whether the transfer of property into a trust constituted a
fraud on the rights of the surviving spouse, while also weighing any equitable fac-
tors which may be relevant in a given case.
4. An inter-vivos transfer may be found to be illusory or testamentary if it dimin-
ishes the probate estate to the extent that nothing is left for the surviving spouse
to elect against while allowing the transferor to retain dominion and control over
the assets placed in trust.
Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 753.
8. The statutory percentage of the elective share under the old law was one third of
personal property and dower in real property. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1, 42-1-1, 43-1-1
(1982) (amended 1992). See Kidwell v. Kidwell, 431 S.E. 2d 346, 349-50 (W. Va. 1993).
1993]
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As the reporter for the Advisory Committee of the West Virginia
Law Institute, which worked on this project, I was fortunate to gain an
insight into certain aspects of IB 4112 not generally available. It is
my hope that this article completes a trilogy of law review articles
designed to provide an understanding of our "new" law of intestate
succession and elective share. The first article, entitled "Reforming the
Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to
Age-Old Problems,"9 compared the statute proposed by the Advisory
Committee of the West Virginia Law Institute with existing law in
West Virginia. (Hereinafter referred to as the proposed legislation).
The proposed legislation was patterned after the Revised Uniform
Probate Code (1990 UPC). The provisions of the proposed legislation
that differed from the 1990 UPC were discussed in the first law re-
view article.
The statute enacted in 1992 by the West Virginia Legislature
(hereinafter referred to as FB 4112) made several amendments to the
proposed legislation. These 1992 amendments and the provision for the
abolition of dower will be discussed in this article. An excellent article
by Professor Patricia J. Roberts on the elective share provision of HB
4112 was published in the Fall issue of the 1992 West Virginia Law
Review. 10 In her article, Professor Roberts discusses the amendments
made in 1992 by the legislature to the proposed elective share provi-
sions legislation. Since Professor Roberts discussed those amendments
in her article, they will be treated in a summary way in this article.
Finally, this article will discuss the "clean up" amendments to HB
4112 requested by the West Virginia State Bar Probate Committee and
enacted by the 1993 legislature as HB 2638.
9. John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succes-
sion and Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61
(1990).
10. Patricia J. Roberts, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share Provi-
sions-West Virginia Enactment Paves the Way, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 55 (1992).
[Vol. 96:85
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II. HOUSE BILL 4112
A. The Abolition of Dower
One of the more interesting discussions before the advisory group
was the proposal to abolish dower. Dower and curtesy had their roots
in feudal England. While an extended discussion of these concepts is
beyond the scope or needs of this article," a brief summary is neces-
sary to appreciate the discussions before the Advisory Committee. 2
11. For an interesting and informative history of Dower and its evolution in the
Virginias see Clarence E. Martin, Dower in Judicial Actions, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 233 (1923-
24).
12. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1952) introduces the discussion of dower
as follows:
Dower at common law was the estate which a widow enjoyed for her life, in
one-third of the lands and tenements of which her husband had been seised solely
and beneficially at any time during the marriage, in fee simple and fee tail, to
which issue of the marriage, if any, might by a possibility have succeeded. Her
interest was ordinarily independent of rights which she might have by testamentary
or intestate succession; it arose not by contract but by operation of law. During
the subsistence of the marriage the wife had a protected expectancy known as
"inchoate" dower, which arose upon marriage and could not be defeated except for
certain defined and limited causes and in certain definite ways. Upon the death of
the husband her interest became "consummate" but was not regarded as an estate
until actually set off and assigned. After assignment the estate arose by operation
of law and was, in general, subject to the usual incidents of life estates; it was
not subject to the claims of the husband's creditors. The term "dower" has fre-
quently been used indiscriminately to describe the widow's inchoate and consum-
mate interests, as well as the estate of dower after assignment.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1952).
In a similar manner, in § 5.57 the discussion of curtesy begins as follows:
[I]n England at common law a husband acquired upon marriage a right to the
rents and profits, together with the use and enjoyment, of all the realty of which
his wife was then seised and of which she thereafter became seised during cover-
ture. His interest, as tenant by the marital right, was a life interest, measured by
their joint lives, which lasted until the dissolution of the marriage or until the
birth of issue, but it entitled him to no rights in her lands after her death. Not
until the birth of issue did the husband acquire rights which he might assert in his
wife's lands if he survived her. If issue of the marriage, capable of inheriting her
property, were born alive, he then acquired in her inheritable estates of which she
had actual seisin an interest known as "curtesy initiate," a present estate measured
by his life alone. If he survived her, that interest became "consummate," and he
was then said to be "tenant by the curtesy" during his lifetime.
1993]
5
Fisher: Statutory Reform Revisited: Toward a Comprehensive Understanding
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
90 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:85
Minor on Real Property 13 explains dower as follows:
Where a woman marries a man lawfully seised at any time during
the coverture of an estate of inheritance, such as that the issue of the mar-
riage (if any) may by possibility inherit it as heirs to the husband, and the
husband dies, the wife surviving, as tenant in dower, is entitled to have
one-third thereof assigned her for life as a prolongation of the husband's
estate annexed by law.
14
Whereas at common law dower was the surviving widow's right
in her deceased husband's real estate, curtesy was the surviving
husband's rights to his deceased wife's real estate. The same author
defined curtesy as follows:
When a man takes a wife lawfully seised at any time during the
coverture of an estate of inheritance, legal or equitable, such as that the
issue of the marriage may by possibility inherit it as heirs to the wife, has
issue by her born alive during the coverture,, and the wife dies, the hus-
band surviving has an estate in her lands for his life, by way of prolonga-
tion annexed by law to the wife's estate, which is called an estate by the
curtesy.1
5
The important differences between common law dower and curtesy are
summarized as follows:
It will be observed that the definition of dower at common law dif-
fers from that of curtesy ... in that (1) the common law does not permit
dower in equitable inheritances while it does permit curtesy therein; (2) no
issue need be born of the marriage in order that the wife may take dower,
while for curtesy the birth of issue alive during the coverture is essential;
(3) the wife as tenant in dower takes only one-third of the deceased
husband's lands, which being undivided necessitates an assignment of her
particular third, while the tenant by the curtesy takes the whole, and there-
fore needs no assignment to identify the land to which he is entitled, and




13. 1 RALEIGH C. MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 248 (Frederick D. G.
Ribble ed., 2d ed. 1928).
14. Id. at 316.
15. Id. § 218, at 279.
16. Id. § 248, at 317.
6
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For a little over one-half century, a statutory form of curtesy
existed in West Virginia. It was not until the general revision of the
Code in 1931 that curtesy was entirely abolished 17 and parity between
surviving spouses was achieved by giving the husband "dower" rights
equal to those of a widow.18 Therefore, for the last six decades, the
statutory form of dower in West Virginia was essentially common law
dower expanded to include dower in equitably owned property' 9 and
equally applicable to both husband and wife.
As long as real property was the principal asset of an estate, it
was at least arguable that dower afforded adequate financial protection
and security for a surviving spouse. However, in a society where per-
sonal property, including life insurance and annuities, constitutes the
principal form of wealth for most people, dower fails to fulfill its
common law objectives. All members of the Advisory Committee
agreed that dower no longer achieved the purposes that gave rise to it
in feudal England. In addition, all members of the Advisory Commit-
tee agreed that the elective share provisions in the proposed statute
represented a significant improvement over the then current law in
West Virginia.
However, when the Advisory Committee discussed the proposal to
abolish dower as a part of the proposed statute, some members of the
committee objected. It was not the at-death "benefits" of dower the
objectors wished to preserve, but rather the marital leverage it provid-
ed. These members of the Advisory Committee were concerned that if
dower were abolished it would make it easier for a title holder of real
17. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-18 (1982) (repealed 1992) ('Tenancy by the curtesy is abol-
ished."). For a discussion of curtesy in West Virginia prior to its abolition see John Rush
Dyer, Note, Tenant By Curtesy-Acts 1921-Construction, 29 W. VA. L.Q. 199 (1923).
18. The former § 43-1-1 provided that:
A surviving spouse shall be endowed of one third of all the real estate whereof
the deceased spouse, or any other to his or her use, or in trust for him or her,
was, at any time during the coverture, seised of or entitled to an estate of inheri-
tance, either in possession, reversion, remainder, or otherwise, unless the right of
such surviving spouse to such dower shall have been lawfully barred or relin-
quished.
W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (1982) (amended 1992).
19. Commercial Banking & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 86 S.E. 307 (W. Va. 1915).
1993]
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property to sell the property in anticipation of divorce and "hide" the
replacement asset from his or her spouse. Since a prudent purchaser
would not accept a deed from the title holding spouse without the
signature of the non-title holding spouse, inchoate dower "forced" the
title holding spouse to obtain the non-title holding spouse's signature
to release dower rights. Obviously, acquiring the non-title holding
spouse's signature would make that spouse aware of the conveyance.
The boon of the divorce lawyers was the bane of title examiners.
The existence of inchoate dower does not prevent a scoundrel spouse
from misleading or deceiving an innocent purchaser as to the title
holder's marital status to the detriment of the innocent purchaser with-
out an immediate corresponding benefit to the non-title holding
spouse.2 °
The potential effect of an unreleased dower interest on the title to
real estate caused dower to be widely criticized by "property" lawyers.
One writer complained that dower not only fails to adequately provide
for a surviving spouse in today's economy, but it also "diminishes the
,,21alienability of land and causes nightmares for title examiners ....
Another author explained: "Common-law dower is a serious obstacle to
free commerce in land and a grave threat to security of titles. 22
20. If the non-title holding spouse survived the title holding spouse, the inchoate dow-
er became consummate dower, which entitled the surviving spouse to either an assignment
of dower in kind or a lump sum of money in lieu of dower. See generally MINOR, supra
note 13, § 314, at 404, which reads as follows:
The right of dower which, before the husband's death, is merely inchoate and
contingent upon the wife's surviving the husband, becomes consummate and vested
upon the husband's death. Even then, however, it does not become an estate, but
is merely a right of action until the land which she is to take as dowress has
been actually set apart and assigned her as her dower. Until her dower has been
thus set apart for her by metes and bounds or by some arrangement which will
secure to her the beneficial enjoyment of the dower right, she is entitled only to
an undivided interest in the lands whereof she is dowable, and a right to sue for
the same if it be illegally withheld. from her, but, independently of statute, not a
right of entry because the limits and boundaries of her part of the land are not
marked out until the assignment.
Id.
21. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate
Code: In Search of An Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REV. 981, 988-89 (1977).
22. William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
[Vol. 96:85
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Dower's mischief to land titles lies in the fact that it is a
nonrecordable right that arises by operation of law upon the happening
of certain events. The omission of the non-title holding spouses's sig-
nature may be the result of an intentional deception or an "honest"
mistake.
As the legislatures of various states attempted to address the defi-
ciencies of dower as an adequate protection for a surviving spouse, it
became customary to abolish the common law dower concept because
of its adverse effect upon land titles. In fact, dower in a form which
resembles its common law ancestor does not exist in a significant
majority of states.23
In order to get the support of the entire advisory group on this
issue, it became important to find a solution that retained the benefit
discussed above without a corresponding detriment. The West Virginia
Law Institute Council and the Advisory Committee devised a solution
which addressed all of the concerns and became a part of HB 4112.
The first component of the solution was to abolish dower on June 5,
1992, the effective date of HB 4112.24 The important role that dower
had played in marital situations in which there was a possibility of a
divorce, namely, notification to the non-title holding spouse of a con-
veyance of real estate, was preserved in the provision of section 43-1-
2.25
1037, 1054 (1966).
23. The following states still recognize either common law or statutory dower:. Arkan-
sas, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-301 (Michie 1987); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 533-1
(1985) (dower in all lands owned during marriage and prior to July 1, 1977); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-505 (1964); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.020 (1970); Massa-
chusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 189, § 1 (West 1981) (dower in all lands owned by
deceased spouse at death); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.211 (Callaghan 1936); Ohio,
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2103.02 (Baldwin 1953); and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
461 (1959) (widow entitled to one-third of all real estate of which husband dies seised).
The District of Columbia also recognizes dower. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-102 (1953).
24. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (Supp. 1993) ('The estates of dower and curtesy are abol-
ished."). Curtesy had been abolished in 1931. See supra note 17.
25. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2 states:
§ 43-1-2. Notice of conveyance.
(a) For purposes of this section, "conveyance" means a dispositive act intend-
ed to create a property interest in land and includes the creation of a security
interest in real estate.
19931
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Section 43-1-2 accomplishes several objectives. First, as it relates
to conveyances of real estate in which the non-title holding spouse is
not given notice, it shifts the potential financial burden from the inno-
cent purchaser, as it existed with dower, to the title holding spouse
who makes a conveyance in violation of the notice provision of the
statute.26 Second, the statute specifically makes the creation of a secu-
rity interest in real estate a conveyance for the purpose of the stat-
ute.27 Therefore, if a title holding spouse borrows money and uses
real estate as security, the non-title holding spouse must be given
notice. In other words, a scoundrel title holding spouse cannot avoid
the notification requirement by a loan transaction as opposed to a sale.
The emphasis of the statute is on "notice" to the non-title holding
spouse and not on the non-title holding spouse's consent to the trans-
fer. Notification to the non-title holding spouse, therefore, must be
"prior to or within thirty days of the time of the conveyance. '' 28 No-
tice will comply with the statute if it is given before the conveyance,
Cb) Any married person who conveys an interest in real estate shall notify his
or her spouse prior to or within thirty days of the time of the conveyance if the
conveyance involves an interest in real estate to which dower would have attached
if the conveyance had been made prior to the date of enactment of this statute.
(c) A person making a conveyance described in the previous sections shall
have the burden of proof to show compliance with this section. Such burden shall
be met either by:
(1) The signature of the spouse of the conveying party on the conveyance
instrument; or
(2) Such other forms of competent evidence as are admissible in a court of
general jurisdiction in this state under the rules of evidence.
(d) When a married person fails to comply with the notification requirements
of this section, then in the event of a subsequent divorce within five years of said
conveyance, the value of the real estate conveyed, as determined at the time of
the conveyance, shall be deemed a part of the conveyancer's marital property for
purposes of determining equitable distribution or awards of support, notwithstanding
that any consideration for said interest in the real estate may' already be included
in the marital property.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a lien or claim
against the interest in real estate conveyed in violations of this provision.
W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2 (Supp. 1993).
26. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2(d), (e) (Supp. 1993).
27. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2(a) (Supp. 1993).
28. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2(b) (Supp. 1993).
10
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at the time of the conveyance, or within thirty days after the convey-
ance.
Special consideration was given to assure that the practice of
having the non-title holding spouse join into the conveyance for the
purpose of releasing dower would also satisfy the notice requirements
imposed by the "new" statute. Therefore, the statute specifically pro-
vides that the burden of proof to show compliance can be met by
"[t]he signature of the spouse of the conveying party on the convey-
ance instrument., 29 In addition, notice to the non-title holding spouse
can be established in "[s]uch other forms of competent evidence as are
admissible in a court of general jurisdiction in this state under the
rules of evidence."3 A logical source of additional ways to comply
with the notice requirement would be Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Prior to the abolition of dower, the recognized manner for the
non-title holding spouse to release his/her inchoate dower was to join
into the conveyance by executing the deed. Minor on Real Property
describes the process as follows:
Should the husband by his sole act convey, mortgage or contract to
convey his land to another, the wife's contingent right of dower remains to
her, and should she survive her husband she may enforce it against the
grantee, mortgagee or vendee, to whose claim the dower is superior. But
she may during the lifetime of her husband release her contingent right of
dower to such grantee, mortgagee or vendee, and indeed to any tenant of
the freehold, except the husband himself ....
If the wife unites in the husband's conveyance, her joinder does not
actually transfer any estate from the wife, for her inchoate dower is a
mere contingent possibility, not an estate. Her joinder operates merely as a
release enuring by way of extinguishing her contingent future rights as
against the purchaser and those claiming by, through or under him. Hence,
one who receives such a release cannot in general be regarded as an as-
signee of the wife's dower right (in the event she survives her husband)
and entitled to assert it as she might have done but for the release.
31
29. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 1993).
30. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-3(c)(2) (Supp. 1993).
31. MINOR, supra note 13, § 293, at 375-76.
1993]
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An early West Virginia decision explained what was necessary to
release dower as follows:
If a deed be signed and sealed by a married woman and her husband, and
the certificate of her acknowledgement is in due form, yet if she is not on
the face of the deed one of the grantors therein, such deed is inoperative
to convey any interest she may have in the real estate conveyed thereby,
or to relinquish her contingent right of dower in the lands therein
named.32
Thirty-four years later, the court held that a deed which named the
husband and left a blank to be filled in with his wife's name, which
was left blank, was sufficient to release the wife's dower rights. The
court reasoned that since the deed contained words by which the wife
could be identified with absolute certainty as one of the grantors, it
was sufficient.33
As stated above, W. Va. Code section 43-1-2 was designed so that
the practice of having the non-title holding spouse join in the deed to
release dower would satisfy the new notice requirement. Some lawyers
have opted to include a statement in the deed which states that the
reason the non-title holder is joining in the conveyance is to acknowl-
edge notice pursuant to code section 43-1-2.34 The most apparent rea-
son for the precaution of expressly stating the purpose of the signature
on the deed is to avoid any assertions that the non-title holder's signa-
ture on the deed makes him or her responsible for the warranties or
covenants contained in the deed.
32. Laughlin Bros. & Co. v. Fream, 14 W. Va. 322 (1878).
33. Hill v. Horse Creek Coal Land Co., 73 S.E. 718, 719 (W. Va. 1912). Syllabus I
of the Hill case states as follows:
A deed, signed, sealed, and acknowledged by a husband and wife, which, not
naming the wife in the body thereof, makes her a grantor by the designation of
wife of the other grantor, is the deed of the wife, as well as the husband, and
relinquishes her dower in the land.
Id. at 718.
34. An example of such a statement is: John Doe, one of the parties of the first part,
states that he joins in the execution of this deed solely for the purpose of acknowledging
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The concern that a person who has no interest in the land con-
veyed but who joins in the deed to release dower rights may incur
liabilities on the warranties in the deed is not a new one. Following
the general revision of the West Virginia Code in 1931, Professor Leo
Carlin wrote an article entitled "Conveyances by Husband and Wife
Under the Revised Code. 35 Under a subheading of that article enti-
tled Covenants and Warranties, Professor Carlin writes:
Conceding that a husband or a wife is bound by his or her covenant or
warranty in a deed conveying his or her own property, is either spouse so
bound when he or she joins in the other's deed for the purpose of giving
validity to the other's conveyance or for the purpose of releasing a right
of dower or curtesy?
36
While most of this subsection addresses the impact of the Married
Woman's Acts37 on a woman's warranties in deeds conveying her
property, Professor Carlin "answers" his question as follows:
The section in which the provision last quoted38 appears deals exclu-
sively with deeds, writings and contracts concerned with the conveyance
by a married woman of "her own real estate." Hence the provision pur-
ports to make her liable only on a "covenant contained in any such deed,
writing or contract". There is no provision in the Code expressly declaring
that she shall, or shall not, be liable on her covenants or warranties in a
35. Leo Carlin, Conveyances by Husband and Wife Under the Revised Code, 40 W.
VA. L.Q. 1 (1933-34).
36. Id. at 18.
37. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 48-3-1 to -16 (1992).
38. In the quoted portion, Professor Carlin is specifically discussing the last sentence
of § 48-3-3 which reads as follows:
When a married woman signs and delivers any deed or other writing, selling
or conveying her own real estate, the same shall operate to pass or convey from
such married woman and her representatives all right, title and interest in such real
estate that is purported to be sold or conveyed by such deed or other writing, as
effectually as if she were a single woman, except that such deed or other writing
shall not affect her husband's dower, if he does not join therein. When a married
woman signs and delivers a contract or writing agreeing to sell or convey her own
real estate, the same shall operate to bind her to do that which she agrees to do
by such contract or writing, and such contract or writing may be specifically en-
forced. A married woman shall be liable on any covenant contained in any such
deed, writing or contract, the same as if she were a single woman.
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-3 (1992) (emphasis added).
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deed conveying the husband's realty. The two sections following the above
mentioned section in the Revised Code provide for the execution of con-
veyances for the purpose of releasing a right of dower, applying equally to
the husband and the wife. Nothing is said in either of these sections con-
cerning the liability on covenants of either a husband or a wife who exe-
cutes a conveyance for the purpose of releasing a dower right. Is a hus-
band or a wife liable on such a covenant?
It may very well be argued that, under the principle expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the provision in the one section for liability of the
wife when she is conveying her own property and the lack of any such
provision in the other sections applying when she is releasing a right of
dower, indicate an intention that she shall not be bound in the latter in-
stance. By a process of extension, the same reasoning may be applied to
the husband. The dower rights of the husband and the wife are identical,
and so are their general contractual capacities and their capacities to con-
vey. The same provisions regulate their deeds executed for the purpose of
releasing their dower rights. In the present status of their property and
contractual rights and capacities, there is no substantial reason for differen-
tiating between the two as to liability on their personal covenants in each
other's deeds. Hence it may be concluded that, if it was not the intention
that the wife should be bound on such covenants, it was likewise the
intention that the husband should not be bound. Opposed to the implication
which may be construed into the statutes, whether applied to the husband
or the wife, we have the express covenant in the deed and the general
contractual capacity to enter into it.
In the present state of the law, should it be considered overcautious,
when the intention is that only one spouse shall be bound by covenants or
warranties in a deed, expressly to limit the operation of the covenants or
warranties to the spouse who is intended to be bound? Or if it is the
intention that both spouses shall be bound by the covenants or warranties,
to indicate the intention in a form still more emphatic than the usual form
of joint covenants?
39
While the question of whether a spouse who signs a deed to re-
lease his/her dower has apparently not been decided by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, it has been decided in a number of
other jurisdictions.
In Center v. Elgin City Banking Co.,4° the court stated that "[a]
husband who joins with his wife in a conveyance of her real estate
merely for the purpose of releasing his dower, is not liable upon the
39. Carlin, supra note 35, at 21-22.
40. 57 N.E. 439 (Il. 1900).
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covenants contained in the deed .... .41 The general acceptance of
this rule is evidenced by the fact that it was summarized in Corpus
Juris as follows:
Hence, where an obligation is created by two or more, the general pre-
sumption is that it is joint, and words of severance are necessary to over-
come this primary presumption; but this rule does not apply to covenants
joint in form made by husband and wife in conveyances of the husband's
property, unless it appears that the sole consideration for the deed was
received by her and was by her husband so intended.42
A logical extension of the rule that a spouse is not liable on cove-
nants in the deed where he or she joins solely to release dower rights
would be that a spouse should not be liable where the only purpose in
joining in the deed, whether expressed or implied, is to acknowledge
notice pursuant to the provision of W. Va. Code section 43-1-2.
Since the passage of HB 4112, there have been several questions
raised relating to the abolition of dower. Essentially, the questions fall
into one of two categories. The first is: If the property was acquired
before June 5, 1992, does the non-title holding spouse have to join
into deeds executed after June 5, 1992, to waive dower? The second
question is: If a deed was delivered before June 5, 1992, without the
signature of the non-title holding spouse, does the non-title holding
spouse have dower if the title holding spouse dies after June 5, 1992?
The answer to both questions is that the non-title holding spouse does
not have dower. To understand the answer, one needs to understand
the legal characteristics of dower.
In Carver v. Ward,43 our court, in describing a wife's contingent
dower right, explained:
41. Id. at 440. See also Warner v. Flack, 116 N.E. 197 (Ill. 1917); Smith v. Gaines,
97 So. 739 (Ala. 1923); Pauley v. Knouse, 192 N.W. 195 (Neb. 1923); Fairfax State Sav.
Bank v. Coligan, 234 N.W. 537 (Iowa 1931); Edgewater Coal Co. v. Swinney, 65 S.W.2d
674 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933); Crain v. Warner, 87 Pa. Super. 605 (1926); Seeberger v. Tutt,
224 S.W. 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920). See generally Watts v. Ramsey, 2 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn.
1928). But see Tucker v. Walker, 437 S.W.2d 788 (Ark. 1969).
42. 15 C.J. Covenants § 22(b) (1918).
43. 95 S.E. 828 (W. Va. 1918).
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It is not property, and has no commercial value capable of ascertainment.
It is a mere contingency wisely ordained for the protection of the wife in
case she is left a widow, an event which may never happen, and until that
contingency does arise the law does not regard the inchoate right as prop-
erty having transferable quality or commercial value. The law makes provi-
sion for its release or extinguishment, but none whereby it may be passed
to another. By joining her husband in the execution of a deed of convey-
ance, the wife simply releases her contingent right, and is thereby estopped
to assert claim to dower; she does not convey anything."
The United States Supreme Court in Randall v. Kreiger45 ex-
plained dower's characteristics as follows:
During the life of the husband the right [of dower] is a mere expec-
tancy or possibility. In that condition of things, the lawmaking power may
deal with it as may be deemed proper. It is not a natural right. It is whol-
ly given by law, and the power that gave it may increase, diminish, or
otherwise alter it, or wholly take it away. It is upon the same footing with
the expectancy of heirs, apparent or presumptive, before the death of the
ancestor. Until that event occurs the law of descent and distribution may
be moulded according to the will of the legislature. 6
Keeping in mind that dower was nothing more than a contingency
until the spouse dies, the court's analogy to the expectancy of heirs is
helpful in understanding that to abolish inchoate dower does not affect
a protected property right. Therefore, there is no constitutional prohibi-
tion against abolishing it. In Ruby v. Ruby,47 the court stated in Sylla-
bus point 1:
A wife's right of dower, so long as it remains inchoate, is subject
absolutely to the control of the Legislature, which may modify or destroy
it at will without exceeding its constitutional limits; and this right of dower
becomes consummate and vested only by the death of the husband."
The United States Supreme Court used similar language in holding
that dower was not a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or immunity.
44. Id. at 830.
45. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1874).
46. Id. at 148.
47. 163 S.E. 717 (W. Va. 1932).
48. Id. See also MINOR, supra note 13, § 282, at 359-60.
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It explained that inchoate dower is "at most . .. a right which, while
it exists, is attached to the marital contract or relation; and it always
has been deemed subject to regulation by each state as respects proper-
ty within its limits."49 Therefore, as it relates to the abolition of dow-
er, the important question is whether the decedent died before or after
June 5, 1992, and not when the property was acquired or conveyed.
B. Changes to the Proposed Legislation Elective Share Provision
When the legislature considered the proposed legislation in 1992,
it made several changes. Two of the changes involved the elective
share portion of the statute. One of the changes inserted the phrase
"acquired during the marriage of the decedent and the surviving
spouse" to a provision describing certain assets to be included in the
augmented estate.50 The example provided to the House Judiciary
Committee to illustrate the purpose for the change is as follows: As-
sume A and B are married, that they have adult children, that B dies
and that following B's death, A deposits money in joint certificates of
deposit (or joint savings accounts) in A's name and the name of an
adult child; then A marries X. The suggestion was that this fund (the
joint certificate of deposit or joint savings account) was an asset from
the first marriage now held jointly by the surviving spouse and the
children of the first marriage and, therefore, should not be "reachable"
by X if A dies within two years. This amendment to section 42-3-
2(b)(2)(ii) and its effect are explained and discussed by Professor
Roberts in her article and, therefore, will not be repeated herein.5
The second 1992 amendment to the- elective share section dealt
with the amount of the supplemental elective share. The proposed
statute read as follows:
If the sum of the amounts described in subdivisions (3) and (4), subsection
(b) of section two, and subdivisions (1) and (3), subsection (a), section six
of this article, and that part of the elective-share amount payable from the
decedent's probate and reclaimable estates under subsections (b) and (c),
49. Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co., 258 U.S. 314, 318 (1922).
50. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-2(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1993).
51. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 83-86, 88-89.
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section six of this article, is less than fifty thousand dollars, the surviving
spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount equal to fifty
thousand dollars, minus the sum of the amounts described in those sec-
tions. The supplemental elective-share amount is payable from the
decedent's probate estate and from recipients of the decedent's probate
estate and from recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate in the order
of priority set forth in subsections (b) and (c), section six of this article.52
The Uniform Probate Code contemplated that each legislature
would establish a dollar amount for this supplemental elective share
most appropriate for each state given the social/economic factors of the
state. The "fifty thousand dollars" contained in the proposed legislation
was, therefore, simply a suggested amount for consideration. The
"amendment" to the proposed statute to change fifty thousand to twen-
ty-five thousand was an exercise of the legislature's discretion to es-
tablish an appropriate dollar amount for West Virginia. The "amend-
ment" to the proposed statute would be accomplished by striking the
word "fifty" and inserting in lieu thereof the word "twenty-five" in
this section. However, the way the amendment was prepared, "fifty"
was changed to "twenty-five" the first time it appeared in this section,
but the corresponding change in the next line from "fifty" to "twenty-
five" was not made. The "partial amendment" of this section thereby
created a patent internal inconsistency within this section. This drafting
"mistake" was corrected in the "clean up" legislation passed in 1993.
C. Changes to the Spouse's Intestate Share
The major changes to the proposed legislation in 1992 related to
the spouse's share of the decedent's estate in the event of intestate
succession. Prior to the enactment of IB 4112, West Virginia laws of
intestate succession were modeled after the statues adopted in Virginia
in 1785.53 A number of empirical studies, summarized in the earlier
article,54 established that the intestate succession statutes prepared
when the "colonies" gained their independence from England no longer
52. H.B. 4112, 70th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 42-3-1(b) (1992).
53. See generally John W. Fisher, II, Spousal Property Rights-'Til Death Do They
Part,' 90 W. VA. L. REv. 1169, 1170-72 (1988).
54. See id. at 1172-81.
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reflected either the interest or the needs of the citizens in our post-
World War II society. The proposed legislation, therefore, followed the
intestate succession patterns proposed in the 1990 RUPC, which relied
upon the empirical studies and the experience gained under the original
UPC. The empirical studies established that "most people" wanted a
significantly greater preference in favor of the surviving spouse than
provided for in the statutory schemes that had evolved from the com-
mon law canons of descent.55
The changes made by the legislature in 1992 to the proposed
statute's intestate succession provisions involved the share of the sur-
viving spouse in those situations where (1) either the decedent or the
surviving spouse had children not born of the other, and (2) where the
decedent was survived by a spouse and parent(s), but without descen-
dants.5 6 As proposed, these sections provided for a "lump sum" or
55. The introductory comment of the 1967 Uniform Probate Code to the intestate
succession section contains the following explanation for the new pattern proposed therein:
The existing statutes on descent and distribution in the United States vary from
state to state. The most common pattern for the immediate family retains the im-
print of history, giving the widow a third of realty (sometimes only for life by her
dower right) and a third of the personality, with the balance passing to issue.
Where the decedent is survived by no issue, but leaves a spouse and collateral
blood relatives, there is wide variation in disposition of the intestate estate, some
states giving all to the surviving spouse, some giving substantial shares to the
blood relatives. The Code attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of
wealth as to disposition of his property at death, and for this purpose the prevail-
ing patterns in wills are useful in determining what the owner who fails to exe-
cute a will would probably want.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1 cmt. (1967) [hereinafter UPC].
The preference for the surviving spouse is summarized in the comment to UPC § 2-
102 as follows:
This section gives the surviving spouse a larger share than most existing
statutes on descent and distribution. In doing so, it reflects the desires of most
married persons, who almost always leave all of a moderate estate or at least one-
half of a larger estate to the surviving spouse when a will is executed. A husband
or wife who desires to leave the surviving spouse less than the share provided by
this section may do so by executing a will, subject of course to possible election
by the surviving spouse to take an elective share . . ..
Id. § 2-102 cmt.
The proposed statute and the reason for it was discussed in the earlier article and
will not be repeated herein. See Fisher, supra note 53, at 1173-88.
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"minimum amount" for the surviving spouse and then a percentage of
the estate in excess of the minimum amount. The reason for the "floor
amounts" and a percentage of the balance of the estates is succinctly
stated in the comment to this section of the 1990 RUPC. The drafters
explain:
If the decedent leaves surviving descendants and if the surviving
spouse (but not the decedent) has other descendants, and thus the
decedent's descendants are unlikely to be the exclusive beneficiaries of the
surviving spouse's estate, the surviving spouse receives the first $150,000
plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate. The purpose is to as-
The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(a) The entire intestate estate if:
(1) No descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(2) All of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the
surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who
survives the decedent;
(b) The first two hundred thousand dollars, plus three fourths of any balance
of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but
a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(c) The first one hundred fifty thousand dollars, plus one half of any balance
of the intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also de-
scendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more sur-
viving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(d) The first one hundred thousand dollars, plus one half of any balance of
the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not
descendants of the surviving spouse.
H.B. 4112, 70th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 42-1-3 (1992) (emphasis added).
As enacted § 42-1-3 provided:
The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(a) The entire intestate estate if:
(1) No descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(2) All of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the
surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who
survives the decedent;
(b) Three fourths of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent
survives the decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(c) Three fifths of the intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving de-
scendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse
has one or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(d) One half of the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviv-
ing descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.
Act of March 7, 1992, ch. 75, 1992 W. Va. Acts, 661, 669 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 96:85
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/5
INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARE
sure the decedent's own descendants of a share in the decedent's intestate
estate when the estate exceeds $150,000.
If the decedent has other descendants, the surviving spouse receives
$100,000 plus one half of the balance. In this type of case, the decedent's
descendants who are not descendants of the surviving spouse are not natu-
ral objects of the bounty of the surviving spouse.
57
In 1992, the legislature removed the "floor amount" and increased
the percentage in section 42-1-3(c) from one half to three fifths of the
intestate estate received by the surviving spouse. The reason for these
changes in the intestate succession section of the proposed statute was
not articulated during the committee sessions in the same manner as
the "amendment" which added the phrase "acquired during the mar-
riage of the decedent and the surviving spouse" to section 42-3-
2(b)(2)(ii).5' I believe that it is fair to assume that for some legisla-
tors the proposed change in the distribution of the intestate estate
simply constituted too great of a shift from the "old" distribution pat-
tern. Those who had read the various studies based on the empirical
data, or reflected on the distribution patterns of clients coming to their
offices for "simple" wills understood and supported the proposed
statute's intestate distribution. However, apparently for others, when
compared with the "old" statute, the proposed statute must have intu-
itively appeared to be too drastic of a change. The legislature, there-
fore, "zeroed out" the dollar amount designed to assure a minimum
estate to a surviving spouse.
Except for the change to section 42-1-3(b), 59 the legislature's
amendments stayed within the general principle of favoring the sur-
viving spouse more than the old law had, in a manner generally con-
sistent with the empirical studies.6° It is recognized that reasonable
minds may differ on whether some "floor amount" should have been
maintained, or entirely removed, as occurred in West Virginia. It is
submitted, however, that the most important thing is that HB 4112
57. REVISED UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (1990) [Hereinafter RUPC].
58. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
59. See supra notes 56, 61.
60. See generally Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 9, at 72-81.
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significantly and substantially improved the intestate succession provi-
sion in our state.
The one area in which the 1992 legislative amendments to the
proposed legislation made a "step backward" was the change to section
42-1-3(b).61 The amendments removing the minimum amounts for the
surviving spouse in section 42-1-3(b) produced an unintended and
undesirable result. This "problem" was corrected by the legislature in
1993.
In section 42-1-3(b) of the proposed legislation, the parent(s)
would have shared in the intestate estate in a very limited number of
cases, i.e., there would be relatively few cases of intestacy where the
"probate" estate exceeded $200,000 and there were parents of the
decedent but no descendants. In most situations in which the parent(s)
would have shared under this proposed section, there would be a re-
cently married, young couple. Typically, the estate for such a couple
would be relatively small, and frequently the assets would be in the
husband's and wife's names with the right of survivorship. Therefore,
in such situations, if the first $200,000 of the probate estate went to
the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse would usually inherit the
61. Under HB 4112, the intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse was: "[t]hree
fourths of the intestate estate, if no descendants of the decedent survives the decedent, but
a parent of the decedent survives the decedent." Act of March 7, 1992, ch. 75, 1992 W.
Va. Acts 661, 669 (amended 1993).
The proposed statute would have provided the surviving spouse "[t]he first two hun-
dred thousand dollars, [The dollar amount was to be determined by the legislature], plus
three fourths of any balance of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent sur-
vives the decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent."
H.B. 4112, 70th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 42-1-3(b) (1992).
Before 1992 § 42-1-1(b) provided: "If there be no child, nor descendant of any
child, then the whole shall go to the wife or husband, as the case may be." W. VA. CODE
§ 42-1-1(b) (1982) (amended 1992).
Section 42-2-1 provided for distribution of the personal estate as follows:
(a) If the intestate was a married woman, and leave issue surviving, her husband
shall be entitled to one third of such surplus, and if she leave no issue, he shall
be entitled to the whole thereof;
(b) If the intestate leave a widow and issue by the same or a former marriage,
the widow shall be entitled to one third of such surplus, and if he leave no such
issue, she shall be entitled to the whole thereof.
W. VA. CODE § 42-2-1 (1982) (repealed 1992).
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entire estate.62 Perhaps the most common example of when the par-
ent(s) would share in such an estate would involve a young married
couple, with the death of one caused by a "tort" injury which results
in a substantial wrongful death recovery by the decedent's estate. In
this hypothetical, the empirical studies showed that if there were suffi-
cient assets to adequately provide for the surviving spouse, most of
those surveyed wanted their parent(s) to share in the "surplus" as-
sets.63
The empirical studies tend to support an aspect of human nature
that we may intuitively suspect. First, that the bonding process with a
new spouse evolves over a period of time as the parental ties lessen.
Second, that young couples suspect that if something happens to one
of them, the other is likely to remarry and the "decedent" does not
want the "successor" spouse to "enjoy" a windfall as a result of his or
her death. Therefore, removing the lump sum dollar amount from this
section changed the applicability of the statute from one in which the
parent would share in the decedent's estate in only "unusual" circum-
stances, to one in which the parent (if there were no descendants of
the decedent) would share in every such estate, even the very small or
meager estates. As discussed below, the 1993 legislature "corrected"
62. Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, who served as reporter for the RUPC, explains
the reason for this particular distribution:
Why not, then, officially grant the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate
when the decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent? The rationale is that
a childless decedent with a surviving spouse and at least one surviving parent and
with an estate significantly in excess of $243,000 who dies intestate is likely to
have died fairly young and without expecting to have such a large estate. (A
decedent who actually accumulated an estate of this size is likely to be older and
to have a will. [See Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon, and William Rau, Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in
the United States, 1978 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 319, 336-39 (1978)], reporting
that, among those surveyed, 69 percent with estates of $200,000 and over had
wills (the $200,000 figure is adjusted for inflation between the time of the pub-
lication of this article and today); and further reporting that 61 percent of those
46-54 had wills, 63 percent age 55-64 had wills, and 85 percent of those 65 and
over had wills, but only 12 percent of those between the ages of 17 and 34 had
wills.)
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Probate Rights in a Multiple-Marriage Society, reprinted
in 45 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 339 n.27 (1989).
63. See Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 9, at 77-80.
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this situation to produce a much better result in the vast majority of
the cases likely to arise with these facts.
11. 1993 AMENDMENT-HOUSE BILL 2638
A. Amending Section 42-1-3-Share of Spouse
On April 10, 1993, HB 2638 was passed and became effective
ninety days from its passage. House Bill 2638 contained the request
for "clean up" amendments to BB 4112, which were prepared and
recommended by the West Virginia State Bar Probate Committee. A
number of members of this committee had served on the Advisory
Committee that had prepared the proposed legislation, and a number
had also served as presenters of Continuing Legal Education programs
explaining the "new" statute. The initial experiences with the new
statute, suggested that some "clean up" legislation would be helpful.
Essentially, the amendments contained in IB 2638 clarified certain
aspects of FB 4112. The one major substantive change in HB 2638
was to amend section 42-1-3(b) (discussed above) to provide that if
the decedent was survived by a spouse and parent(s), but no descen-
dants, the surviving spouse would inherit the entire estate.64 The 1993
amendment in effect restored the pre-HB 4112 disposition of intestate
assets as to this particular factual situation. 5 The 1993 amendment
deleted "or parent" from section 42-1-3(a) and omitted what had been
section 42-1-3(b). As amended, section 42-1-3 now reads:
§ 42-1-3. Share of spouse
The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(a) The entire intestate estate if:
(1) No descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(2) All of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants
of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving
spouse who survives the decedent;
(b) Three fifths of the intestate estate, if all of the decedent's
64. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
65. See supra note 61.
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surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and the
surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants who are not de-
scendants of the decedent;
(c) One half of the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's
surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.6
B. Clarifying the Term "Homestead"
Both the 1969 and 1990 versions of the Uniform Probate Code
contained provisions for a homestead allowance 67 and for property
exemptions. These provisions were a part of a comprehensive plan
contained in the Uniform Probate Codes for providing support to the
surviving spouse and family. The homestead provisions in the Uniform
Probate Code represented an additional grant of funds, and the exempt
66. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (Supp. 1993).
67. Section 2-402. Homestead Allowance.
A decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance of [$15,000].
If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each dependent child of the
decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to [$15,000] divided by
the number of minor and dependent children of the decedent. The homestead al-
lowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims against the estate. Home-
stead allowance is in addition to any share passing to the surviving spouse or
minor or dependent child by the will of the decedent, unless otherwise provided,
by intestate succession, or by way of elective share.
RUPC § 2-402 (1990).
68. Section 2-403. Exempt Property.
In addition to the homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving spouse is entitled
from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000 in excess of any security inter-
ests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and per-
sonal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's children are entitled
jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are selected and the value in
excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than
$10,000, or if there is not $10,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the
spouse or children are entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent
necessary to make up the $10,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets
needed to make up a deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims
against the estate, but the right to any assets to make up a deficiency of exempt
property abates as necessary to permit earlier payment of homestead allowance and
family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to
the surviving spouse or children by the decedent's will, unless otherwise provided,
by intestate succession, or by way of elective share.
RUPC § 2-403 (1990).
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property provision was a companion section protecting certain addition-
al assets for the family.
In contrast, the West Virginia Constitutional Homestead provi-
sion69 and its implementing statutory provisions70 principally function
to exempt the homestead asset from creditors. Therefore, the Advisory
Committee that prepared the proposed legislation concluded that since
West Virginia's statutory homestead provisions implemented the state
constitutional provision, the UPC provision on homestead and exempt
property could not be included as part of the proposed statute. While
the Uniform Probate Code's provisions for homestead and exempt
property were omitted from the proposed legislation, references to
those terms were not deleted from other provisions. Since the concept
of the West Virginia Homestead provision, to exempt property from
creditors, is different from the RUPC's provision to provide additional
assets, the references in HB 4112 to "homestead allowance" created
unnecessary confusion. Therefore, BB 2638 amended the provisions of
HB 4112 by striking the terms "Homestead Allowance" and "exempt
71property" where necessary.
C. An Election Against Intestate Succession
As discussed above, HB 4112 provides a statutory framework for
a spouse to exercise his or her elective share rights, which in effect
implements the "equitable" concept the court had recognized in John-
son v. Farmers & Merchants Bank.72 Implied in the new statutory
provisions of FEB 4112 was the right of a surviving spouse to elect
against an intestate succession.73 Because the concept of electing
against an intestate succession is a new concept in West Virginia, an
explicit statement was added to the statute to make it clear that a
spouse can elect against an intestate estate.74 The right to elect
69. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48.
70. W. VA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -3 (1985).
71. The terms were deleted from W. VA. CODE §§ 42-1-3b, 42-3-2(b)(1), (3), and 42-
3-3a(a), (d).
72. 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989).
73. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (Supp. 1993).
74. Section 42-3-1 was amended to add "(a) the surviving spouse of a decedent who
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against an intestate share could be important where a decedent made
substantial inter-vivos transfers, which could be recaptured into an
augmented estate, and then died intestate with a relatively small "pro-
bate" estate. Even though the surviving spouse's share would not be
less than fifty percent (50%) of the intestate estate,75 if substantial
assets had been transferred during the decedent's lifetime and within
the recapture period for the augmented estate,76 the share provided by
incremented vesting (a maximum of fifty percent (50%) after fifteen
(15) years of marriage)77 may be more beneficial to the surviving
spouse.
Another clarifying amendment was made in section 42-3-3 entitled
"Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse." Under the provisions
of this section, "[t]he right of election may be exercised only by a
surviving spouse who is living when the petition for the elective share
is filed in the court .... ,"7 The section further provides for an elec-
tion on behalf of a living spouse who is incapacitated. Under this
provision, if the election is made on behalf of a surviving spouse who
is incapacitated, the elective share payable from the decedent's probate
and reclaimable estates is administered by a trustee for the support of
the surviving spouse.79 As to the assets of this trust, section 42-3-
3(b)(3) as enacted in HB 4112 provided that "[u]pon the surviving
spouse's death, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property
under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased
spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if that prede-
ceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse., 80 This
proposed section is section 2-203 of the RUPC. In the preparation of
the proposed legislation, the last phrase of section 2-203 which read
"or (ii) to that predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711" was
dies domiciled in this state has a right of election, against either the will or the intestate
share . . . ." W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1(a) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
75. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (Supp. 1993).
76. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-2 (Supp. 1993).
77. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1(a) (Supp. 1993).
78. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-3(a) (Supp. 1993).
79. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-3(a) (Supp. 1993).
80. Act of March 7, 1992, ch. 75, 1992 W. Va. Acts 661, 681 (amended 1993).
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inadvertently omitted. 81 The comment to this section succinctly states
the purpose of this section as follows:
At the surviving spouse's death, the remaining custodial trust property
does not go to the surviving spouse's estate, but rather under the residuary
clause of the will of the predeceased spouse whose probate and reclaim-
able estates were the source of the property in the custodial trust, as if the
predeceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse. In the
absence of a residuary clause, the property goes to the predeceased
spouse's heirs.82
The 1993 amendment provides the missing guidance as to what
happens in the absence of a residuary clause by adding "or, if there
was no residuary clause or no will of that predeceased spouse, to the
persons in such shares as would succeed to that predeceased spouse's
intestate estate as if that predeceased spouse died immediately after the
surviving spouse.' ' 83 This clarification becomes especially helpful in
light of the amendment discussed above making it explicit that a sur-
viving spouse can elect against an intestate share.
Finally, in understanding this section, the explanation provided in
the comments to this section of the RUPC should be helpful. It states:
The approach of this section is based on a general expectation that
most surviving spouses are, at the least, generally aware of an [sic] accept
[that] their decedents' overall estate plans are not antagonistic to them.
Consequently, to elect the elective share, and not have the disposition of
that part of it that is payable from the decedent's probate and reclaimable
estates under Sections 2-207(b) and (c) governed by subsections (b) and
(c), the surviving spouse must not be an incapacitated person. When the
election is made by or on behalf of a surviving spouse who is not an
81. RUPC § 2-203 (1990).
82. Id. cmt.
83. As amended § 42-3-3(b)(3) reads:
Upon the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust
property under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased spouse
against whom the elective share was taken, as if that predeceased spouse died
immediately after the surviving spouse, or, if there was no residuary clause or no
will of that predeceased spouse, to the persons and in such shares as would suc-
ceed to that predeceased spouse's intestate estate as if that predeceased spouse died
immediately after the surviving spouse.
W. VA. CODE § 42-3-3(b)(3) (Supp. 1993).
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incapacitated person, the surviving spouse has personally signified his or
her opposition to the decedent's overall estate plan.
If the election is made on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an
incapacitated person, subsections (b) and (c) control the disposition of that
part of the elective-share amount or supplemental elective-share amount
payable under Sections 2-207(b) and (c) from the decedent's probate and
reclaimable estates. The purpose of subsections (b) and (c), generally
speaking, is to assure that that part of the elective share is devoted to the
personal economic benefit and needs of the surviving spouse, but not to
the economic benefit of the surviving spouse's heirs or devisees.m
D. Clarification of Section 41-1-6-Revocation of Will by Divorce
The 1990 Uniform Probate Code contains eight articles and in-
cludes comprehensive provisions dealing with intestate and testate
succession including the formality of wills and rules of construction,
probate administration and pro.cedures, non-probate transfers and mat-
ters. 85 The West Virginia Law Institute's project initially focused on
the law of intestate succession, but given the manner in which our
"old" elective share statute incorporates the intestate succession provi-
sion,86 the committee also had to address elective share.
84. RUPC § 2-203 cmt. (1990). Note that RUPC § 2-207 corresponds to W. VA.
CODE § 42-3-6 (Supp. 1993).
85. Article II contains the following parts: Part 1, Intestate Succession; Part 2, Elec-
tive Share of Surviving Spouse; Part 3, Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills; Part
4, Exempt Property and Allowances; Part 5, Wills, Will Contracts, and Custody and Deposit
of Wills; Part 6, Rules of Construction Applicable Only to Wills; Part 7, Rules of Con-
struction Applicable to Donative Dispositions in Wills and Other Governing Instruments; Part
8, General Provisions Concerning Probate and Nonprobate Transfers; Part 9, Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities; Time Limit on Options in Gross, etc.; and Part 10, Uniform Interna-
tional Wills Act. See RUPC at 2-4.
86. W. Va. Code § 42-3-1 reads:
§ 42-3-1 Renunciation of will by husband or wife.
When any provision is made in a will for the surviving wife or husband of the
testator, such surviving wife or husband may, within eight months from the time
of the admission of the will to probate, renounce such provision. If the will be
contested, or the order admitting it to probate be appealed from, such renunciation
may be made within two months of the final decision on such contest or appeal.
Such renunciation shall be made either in person before the county court by which
the will is admitted to probate, or by a writing recorded in the office of the clerk
of such court, upon such acknowledgement or proof as would authorize a deed to
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While the RUPC is designed to permit states to enact selected
parts of it, as a comprehensive statute its separate parts include a
significant number of cross-reference to other provisions. Part 3 of
Article II of the RUPC deals with "Spouse and Children Unprovided
For in Wills." For a variety of reasons, the Advisory Committee de-
cided it would not recommend all parts of Part 3 of Article 1.87 The
Committee did, however, believe that (along with the proposed revi-
sions of intestate succession and elective share) revocation of wills as
provided in West Virginia Code section 41-1-6 needed to be addressed.
In addition to the provision in Article II, Part 3 which included provi-
sions for surviving spouses married after the decedent had executed his
or her will, section 2-804 of the RUPC provided for revocation of
both probate and non-probate transfers by divorce. In effect, the situa-
tions provided for in section 41-1-6 were dealt with in two distinct
parts of the RUPC, and the portion covered in Part 8 of Article II
dealt with both probate and non-probate transfers.88
be admitted to record. If such renunciation be made, or if no provision be made
for such surviving wife or husband, such surviving wife or husband shall have
such share in the real and personal estate of the decedent as such surviving wife
or husband would have taken if the decedent had died intestate leaving children;
otherwise the surviving wife or husband shall have no more of the decedent's
estate than is given by the will.
W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1982) (amended 1992) (emphasis added). See generally Kidwell v.
Kidwell, 431 S.E.2d 346, 349 (W. Va. 1993).
87. See Elma M. Reed, Note, Premarital Wills and Pretermitted Children: West Vir-
ginia Law v. Revised Uniform Probate Code, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 197 (1990).
88. The introductory comments to Part 8 reads:
GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING PROBATE
AND NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
GENERAL COMMENT
Part 8 contains four general provisions that cut across probate and nonprobate
transfers. Section 2-801 is the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act; this
Act replaces the narrower Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers By Will, Intestacy or
Appointment Act, which was incorporated into the pre-1990 Code. The broader
disclaimer act is now appropriate, given the broadened scope of Article II in cov-
ering nonprobate as well as probate transfers.
Section 2-802 deals with the effect of divorce and separation on the right to
elect against a will, exempt property and allowances, and an intestate share.
Section 2-803 spells out the legal consequence of intentional and felonious
killing on the right of the killer to take as heir and under wills and revocable
inter-vivos transfers, such as revocable trusts and life insurance beneficiary designa-
[Vol. 96:85
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Since 'the relevant sections of the RUPC were a part of a compre-
hensive statutory scheme which dealt with a much larger issue than the
intestate succession/elective share project of our advisory committee, it
was not feasible to adapt those sections to our needs. Our committee,
therefore, turned to the 1969 UPC to find a more compatible provision
to include in our proposed statute. Therefore, the new section 41-1-6 is
patterned after section 2-508 of the 1969 UPC.
When the new section 41-1-6 was carefully analyzed for the Con-
tinuing Legal Education presentation, it was discovered that the new
section could be construed to produce a result which could be incon-
sistent with a testators expressed wishes. As enacted in HB 4112,
section 41-1-6 provided:
§ 41-1-6. Revocation by divorce; no revocation by other changes of
circumstances
If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage an-
nulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment of
property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a
general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any
nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator, or
guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property prevented
from passing to a former spouse because of revocation by divorce or an-
tions.
Section 2-804 deals with the consequences of a divorce on the right of the
former spouse (and relatives of the former spouse) to take under wills and revoca-
ble inter-vivos transfers, such as revocable trusts and life-insurance beneficiary
designations.
RUPC art. II, pt. 8 cmt. (1990).
Comment
Purpose and Scope of Revision. The revisions of this section, pre-1990 Sec-
tion 2-508, intend to unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers. As origi-
nally promulgated, pre-1990 Section 2-508 revoked a predivorce devise to the
testator's former spouse. The revisions expand the section to cover "will substi-
tutes" such as revocable inter-vivos trusts, life-insurance and retirement-plan benefi-
ciary designations, transfer-on-death accounts, and other revocable dispositions to
the former spouse that the divorced individual established before the divorce (or
annulment). As revised, this section also effects a severance of the interests of the
former spouses in property that they held at the time of the divorce (or annul-
ment) as joint tenants with the right of survivorship; their co-ownership interests
become tenancies in common.
Id. § 2-804 cmt.
19931
31
Fisher: Statutory Reform Revisited: Toward a Comprehensive Understanding
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
116 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:85
nulment passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, and
other provisions conferring some power or office on the former spouse are
interpreted as if the spouse failed to survive the decedent. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section three, article three, chapter forty-one of this code,
the share of such spouse shall be distributed according to the residuary
clause of the decedent's will or according to the statute of intestate succes-
sion for the decedent's property. If provisions are revoked solely by this
section, they are revived by testator's remarriage to the former spouse. For
purposes of this section, divorce or annulment means any divorce or annul-
ment which would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse. A decree of
separation which does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not
a divorce for purposes of this section. No change of circumstances other
than as described in this section revokes a will."
Under this provision the share devised to the former spouse (i.e.,
spouse before the divorce or annulment) would be distributed accord-
ing to the residuary clause of the decedent's will or according to the
statute of intestate succession for the decedent's property, unless the
will expressly provided for otherwise. As amended in 1993 the section
now provides:
§ 41-1-6. Revocation by divorce; no revocation by other changes of
circumstances.
(a) If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage
annulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment
of property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision confer-
ring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and
any nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator, or
guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property prevented
from passing to a former spouse because of revocation by divorce or an-
nulment passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, ex-
cept that the provisions of section three [41-3-3], article three, chapter
forty-one do not apply, and other provisions conferring some power or
office on the former spouse are interpreted as if the spouse failed to sur-
vive the decedent. If provisions are revoked solely by this section, they are
revived by testator's remarriage to the former spouse. For purposes of this
section, divorce or annulment means any divorce or annulment which
would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse. A decree of separation
which does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce
for purposes of this section. No change of circumstances other than as
described in this section revokes a will.
89. Act of March 7, 1992, ch. 75, 1992 W. Va. Acts 661, 662-63 (amended 1993).
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/5
INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARE
(b) This section applies to all divorces, annulments or remarriages
which become effective after the fifth day of June, one thousand nine
hundred ninety-two.' °
The 1993 amendment struck from the 1992 version of section 41-
1-6 the phrase "the share of such spouse shall be distributed according
to the residuary clause of the decedent's will or according to the stat-
ute of intestate succession for the decedent's property." As amended,
the statute simply provides that the property passes as if the spouse
had failed to survive the decedent. Perhaps the best way to understand
the reason for this amendment is by an example. Assume the will in
question provided that if my spouse does not survive me then I devise
Blackacre to my daughter A. Further assume that the residuary clause
provided that the rest and residue of my estate shall be divided equally
among my grandchildren living at my death. It was recognized that in
spite of the express language stating that if Blackacre did not go to
the spouse it was to go to A, it could be argued under the 1992 ver-
sion of section 41-1-6 that Blackacre should go to the grandchildren
under the residuary clause.
The 1993 amendment resolves this potential problem. Under the
1993 provision (as was also true of the 1992 version), the statute
provides that the anti-lapse statute, section 41-3-3, does not apply and
then states the property which the former spouse would have taken
passes as if he or she had died before the testator or testatrix. If the
will specifically provides for such a contingency, the specific provision
of the will controls. If the will does not specifically provide for such a
contingency, then the property passes under the will's residuary clause,
if there is an applicable residuary clause, and if not, then by intestate
succession.
The second amendment to section 41-1-6 explicitly states that
"[t]his section applies to all divorces, annulments, or remarriages which
became effective after the fifth day of June, one thousand nine hun-
dred ninety-two."9' This amendment makes it clear that if a divorce,
annulment or remarriage occurred before June 5, 1992, that the prior
90. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-6 (Supp. 1993).
91. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-6(b) (Supp. 1993).
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statutory provision which revoked existing wills, "except a will which
makes provisions therein for such contingency" 92 applied and thereby
revokes such a will. The clarifying amendment as to the effective date
should help avoid issues found in some of our sister jurisdictions. 93
E. Procedural Clarification of Elective Share
The 1993 amendments clarified two important aspects of the elec-
tive share provisions. Under HB 4112, if a surviving spouse is entitled
to an elective share and there are insufficient assets to eliminate any
contributions from the decedent's probate estate and the recipients of
the decedent's reclaimable estate, the statute establishes the order in
which the assets are applied to satisfy the elective share.94 If a
spouse elects to pursue the elective share option,
the election must be made by filing in the court and mailing or delivering
to the personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share with-
in .... [the time periods are set forth]. The surviving spouse must give
notice of the time and place set for hearing to persons interested in the
estate and to the distributees and recipients of portions of the augmented
estate whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elec-
tive share.95
Under another portion of this section, the recapture of assets for the
purpose of the elective share "may be maintained against fewer than
all persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is
subject to contribution in any greater amount than he or she would
have been under section two had relief been secured against all per-
sons subject to contribution. 96
The 1993 amendment added a clause to section 42-3-4(b), which
allows the surviving spouse to petition for an extension of time for
making an election, to provide that the notice of the filing of the peti-
tion need only be given to those "against whom the spouse chooses to
92. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-6 (1982) (amended 1992).
93. See generally In re Will of Mitchell, 203 S.E.2d 48 (N.C. 1974); Papen v. Papen,
224 S.E.2d 153 (Va. 1976).
94. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-6 (Supp. 1993).
95. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-4(a) (Supp. 1993).
96. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-4(d) (Supp. 1993).
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proceed under subsection (d) of this section" instead of against all
persons interested in the decedent's reclaimable estate.97 In effect, if
the surviving spouse does not plan to assert rights to reclaimable prop-
erty against a particular party, he or she does not have to notify the
party of the petition for extension. Only those who may ultimately be
required to contribute to the satisfaction of the elective share must be
notified.
The second major procedural amendment relates to the adjudicato-
ry aspects of the elective share provision. Under West Virginia law,
the county commission "shall have jurisdiction in all matters of pro-
bate, the appointment and qualification of personal representatives,
guardians, committees, curators and the settlement of their accounts,
and in all matters relating to apprentices. 98 Consistent with the duties
assigned to the county commission, HB 4112 as a part of its general
definition section provided: "'Court' means the county commission or
branch in this state having jurisdiction in matters relating to the affairs
of decedents." 99
Even a cursory examination of the elective share provisions re-
veals that there are a number of factual issues which may need to be
resoived that are not associated with or similar to other duties assigned
to county commissions.1°° Also, discovery procedures provided in the
97. Section 42-3-4(b) reads as follows:
Within nine months after the decedent's death, the surviving spouse may petition
the court for an extension of time for making an election. If, within nine months
after the decedent's death, the spouse gives notice of the petition to all persons
interested in the decedent's reclaimable estate, against whom the spouse chooses to
proceed under subsection (d) of this section, the court for cause shown by the
surviving spouse may extend the time for election. If the court grants the spouse's
petition for an extension, the decedent's reclaimable estate, described in subdivision
(2), subsection (b), section two of this article, in the hands of those persons
against whom the spouse chooses to proceed under subsection (d) of this section,
is not excluded from the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elec-
tive-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, if the spouse makes an election
by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if
any, a petition for the elective share within the time allowed by the extension:
W. VA. CODE § 42-3-4(b) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
98. W. VA. CODE § 7-1-3 (1993).
99. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-1(3) (Supp. 1993). See generally RUPC § 1-102(7) (1990).
100. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 7-1-1 to -3ff (1993).
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Rules of Civil Procedure, which may be important in certain cases, are
not available in proceedings before the county commission.'0 ' In ef-
fect, HB 4112 had added to the administrative function of probate
matters already assigned to the County Commission an adjudicatory
function, as it related to the elective share/augmented estate, that a
County Commission is not properly equipped to handle. In order to
find a practical solution to this problem, IB 2638 amended section
58-3-1 by adding: "(f) the disposition of disputes arising from the
provisions of article three [§ 42-3-1 et seq.], chapter forty-two of this
code [Provisions Relating to Husband or Wife of Decedent] which
appeal shall be de novo' °  and added 58-3-la, Procedures for ap-
peals.103
The solution provided by these amendments permits the County
Commission to retain its traditional role in probate matters while at the
same time it assures a de novo hearing in a court accustomed and
equipped to handle the issues that may arise in a contested elective
share case.
101. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
102. W. VA. CODE § 58-3-1(f) (Supp. 1993).
103. Section 58-3-la reads as follows:
Any interested person may appeal the final order of the county commission de-
scribed by the provisions of subdivision (f), section one [§ 58-3-1(f)] of this article
to the circuit court as a matter of right by requesting the appeal within four
months after the final order of the county commission is rendered. The appeal
shall be determined by trial de novo. Upon receipt of the request for appeal, the
clerk of the county commission shall collect the circuit court filing fee therefor
and forward the same, together with the final order and the request, to the clerk
of the circuit court. The court may require the clerk of the county commission to
file with the circuit clerk all or any portion of the record of the proceedings
which resulted in the final order. No bond may be required from any party to the
appeal. The final order of the county commission shall be stayed pending the
appeal proceedings. If, after the appeal is filed in the circuit court, the matter is
not brought on for hearing before the end of the second term thereafter, the ap-
peal shall be considered abandoned and shall be dismissed at the cost of the ap-
pellant unless sufficient cause is shown for a further continuance. Upon such dis-
missal, the final order of the county commission is affirmed. No appeal which has
been so dismissed by the circuit court may be reinstated after the expiration of the
next regular term following such dismissal.
W. VA. CODE § 58-3-la (Supp. 1993).
[Vol. 96:85
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARE
IV. CONCLUSION
More than a year has passed since BB 4112 effectuated the first
major statutory reform since statehood in our laws of intestacy and
elective share. As discussed above, by 1992 the court had already
charted a new course for spousal rights at death. The new elective
share statute simply "codified" the spirit of the court's pronouncements
and provided a framework in which the concepts of Davis and John-
son could be implemented.
In the time that has elapsed since HB 4112 took effect, the initial
hostility to the change resulting from its passage appears to be giving
away to acceptance; ambivalence as to the new provision on intestacy
is being replaced by approval, and the apprehension about the new
elective share statute is being supplanted by the complacency of being
able to provide meaningful advice to one's clients.
Now, as always, the best solution to the disposition of one's assets
at death is a will. However, since the empirical studies establish that
more of our citizens will die intestate than testate, the "average citi-
zen" in West Virginia is better served by the statutory provisions exist-
ing today than the law they replaced.
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